DEATH OF AN ADMIRAL

The attack on Isoroku Yamamoto April 1943

Introduction

'Commanders of armies have something better to do than to fire at one another'                        - Lord Wellington

Throughout military history, commanders of armies have fallen in battle, usually as a result of random fire, but rarely have the commanders themselves been the specific targets of the enemies operations.  One exception to this was the attack mounted in April 1943 by P38 lightning's of the US 339th fighter squadron, the aim of which was the elimination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Background

'In the first six to twelve months… I will win victory after victory… but if the war continues after that I have no expectation of success.'       - Admiral Yamamoto

Following World War 1, Yamamoto had spent many years in the US, first as a student at Harvard, and then as Naval Attaché in Washington, and was well aware of America's industrial strength.  When it became obvious that war with America was unavoidable, he devised a strategy based on a lightning opening strike against the US forces in the Pacific, including the fleet at Pearl Harbour.

 

While Yamamoto accepted that the US were unlikely to seek peace, his hope was that, with the fleet destroyed and their bases overrun, this would delay any US response and give Japan time to build a shield of island fortresses to protect her new empire.


Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

Although the attack on Pearl Harbour did severe damage to the US battleship fleet, it missed the aircraft carriers, which were at sea at the time.  Recognising their importance, Yamamoto planned a new operation for mid-1942, directed at the US held island of Midway, which he hoped would lure the US carriers into a trap.  Unfortunately for the Japanese, their naval codes had been broken by the Americans and, knowing the details of Yamamoto's plan they were able to turn the tables, sinking four Japanese carriers for the loss of one of their own.

Opportunity

'I fear all we have done is awaken a sleeping giant and fill it with a desire for vengeance'       - Admiral Yamamoto

As news of the defeat at Midway got out, the morale of the Japanese forces in the Pacific fell.  To attempt to address this, Yamamoto arranged an inspection tour of the front-line bases for April 1943.  Once again, the Americans were able to decipher the Japanese code and obtained full details of the timetable for the visits. 

The military planners realised that there might be an opportunity to use this information to mount a strike against Yamamoto.  However,  senior US naval officers were concerned that mounting such an operation might reveal their ability to read the Japanese codes.  After weighing up the risks, Admiral Nimitz decided the opportunity to get the man responsible for Pearl Harbour was too good too miss, and gave the go-ahead.

Planning

Given the distance and the proximity of Japanese air and naval units, a carrier borne strike was too risky.  At the same time, while the US had captured a forward airbase on Guadalcanal in February, the mission would still require a flight of over 400 miles each way, beyond the range of the existing single-engined fighters.  After considering the options, it was decided that the only aircraft with both the range to reach the target, and the firepower and manoeuvrabilty to deal with the expected heavy fighter opposition was the twin engined Lockheed P38 Lightning. Accordingly, the job was passed to the 339th fighter squadron, under Major John W Mitchell. 

After examining the Japanese itinerary, Mitchell decided that attacking the Admiral while on a ship would not guarantee his death.  Indeed, as Mitchell himself said, "my men wouldn't know a sub-chaser from a sub".  Given this, the attack had to be while the Admiral was in flight, and the likeliest location for an ambush would be as the Admirals flight made their approach to Kahili aerodrome, on Bougaineville. 

 

Anticipating heavy Japanese fighter cover so near to a major Japanese installation (at one time estimated at up to 80 fighters), it was decided that only 4 of the 18 fighters would be tasked with shooting down the transport, the remainder flying top cover.

The Attack

On the night before the attack, mechanics at Henderson Field struggled to fit the extra large drop tanks the fighters would need to make the round trip.  In addition, to enable him to navigate the long over-water flight, a large naval compass was fitted to Major Mitchell's plane. At 07:25 on 18th April 1943, the 18 Lightnings took off for their two-hour flight, following a route designed to avoid any possibly Japanese-held islands. 

One plane was forced to abort during the take off after bursting a tyre, while a second had to turn back due to problems with the new drop tank.  Ironically, both aircraft were from the four-plane 'killer' section, leaving just two P38s, flown by Captain Lanphier and Lt. Barber to make the attempt on the Admirals life.  As a backup, Lt. Holmes and Lt. Hine were switched from top cover to join the actual attack force.

After a relatively uneventful flight, at 09:33 the planes arrived at their target location, a tribute to Major Mitchell's navigation skills.  Almost immediately, Capt. Canning broke the radio silence with a cry of "Bogey, ten o'clock high" having sighted the Admirals flight of two Nakajima G4M2 'Betty' bombers and six Mitsubishi A6M 'Zeke' fighters five miles away. 

 


The 'Killer flight '- Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., Besby F. Holmes & Rex Barber
  shown after the mission


As planned, the U.S. fighters dropped their fuel tanks in readiness for combat, but Lt Holmes hit problems with the ejection and turned out to sea to try and shake the tanks loose.  Following standard procedures, his wingman, Lt Hine, went with him, leaving just two planes for the attack itself. 


Painting by Sergeant Vaughn A. Bass, of the 4th Air Force Historical Section,
based on information provided by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr.

Spotting the American fighters as they closed on their targets, the Zekes turned to meet the threat, while the Betties split up and, sacrificing their height advantage, dived down to treetop level.  While Lanphier turned to meet the first three Zekes, Barber dived towards the nearest Betty, which was heading directly for the nearby fighter base.  Coming in from the rear, Barber opened fire and the Betty began a slow dive with smoke and flames coming from its right wing. 

 

339th Fighter Squadron Patch

Satisfied the Betty was doomed, and not knowing which plane might contain the target, Barber now turned his attention to the second Betty, which was had headed out over the ocean.  Assisted by Lt Holmes, who had by now managed to drop his tanks, Lt. Barber carried out a number of attacks from close range, his own plane taking some damage from pieces blown off the Betty.  Eventually the second bomber hit the water and cartwheeled, there having been no sign of any parachutes before the impact.

Having completed their mission, the U.S. fighters returned to Henderson Field, the only casualty being Lt. Hine, who was last seen leaving the combat area trailing smoke following a clash with the Zeke escorts.

Although the US pilots didn't know it Admiral Yamamoto had been in the first bomber that they had brought down over the jungle.  According to reports from the troops that found the wreckage, Yamamoto had been killed instantly, several rounds hitting him in the head and shoulders as he sat strapped in his seat.

Aftermath

The Japanese kept Yamamoto's death a secret for a month, fearing the impact on  morale.  Finally, on May 21st 1943, his loss  was officially acknowledged and, on 3rd June, he was given a full state funeral.  In keeping with tradition, part of his ashes were buried in a public ceremony in Tuma cemetery in Tokyo, the remainder being interred privately in his ancestral burial grounds at Chuko-Ji Temple in Nagaoka City. 

 

For the U.S. pilots involved, it was expected that Mitchell, Lanphier and Barber  would be nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor, but this was turned down by Admiral 'Bull' Halsey as a punishment for details of the mission being leaked to the press.  Eventually, all three received the Navy Cross, and the remaining pilots on the flight received the Navy Air Medal.    

Although there were no eye-witnesses, following the mission Captain Lanphier claimed full credit for shooting down the admiral, and the air force awarded him the kill based on his account of the action.  A long and acrimonious public debate followed with Lanphier maintaining his account despite the evidence from the rest of the flight. Finally, after re-examining the evidence, and with eyewitness accounts from one of the Zeke pilots and Yamamoto's Chief of Staff, Admiral Ugaki, who had been on the second Betty and survived the crash, the award was eventually shared between Lanphier and Barber.

Conclusions

Although the death of Yamamoto had an impact on both Japanese and American morale, it is debatable whether it had any significant effect of the eventual outcome of the war.  By the time of the mission, Japan had been fighting for 16 months and, despite early successes, was unable to replace the carriers and pilots lost at Midway and had been forced on to the defensive.  In such a situation, as Yamamoto himself had predicted, US industrial strength was decisive, allowing them to build up an unstoppable numerical superiority. 

While hailed as a great strategist for his opening attack on Pearl Harbour, Yamamoto had failed to show any subsequent signs of genius, and his plans for Midway were so complex as to almost guarantee failure.  Given this, it is unlikely that he would have been able to do anything militarily to stop the US forces as they drove towards the Japanese mainland.

That said, he was known as a moderate and we can only speculate as to what influence he might have had on the increasingly desperate government under General Tojo in the closing months of the war, or on the eventual peace agreement.